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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the relationship between corporate environmental disclosure (CED) 
and earnings management (EM) of 245 UK non-financial companies for the period 
between 1 April 2006 and 31 March 2007. Three different theoretical frameworks are 
used to identify the expected association between CER and EM. These include: signalling 
theory, agency theory and stakeholder-legitimacy theory. We find no significant statistical 
association between various measures of discretionary accruals and environmental 
disclosure. This result suggests that UK corporate managers are not using environmental 
disclosure as a technique to reduce the probability that public policy actions will be taken 
against their companies (Patten and Trompeter, 2003). We also find that some corporate 
governance attributes affect the relationship between CER and EM. 
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1. Introduction 
Societal concern tends to be recognised as a significant corporate responsiveness to 
communicate between organisations and the society with regard to social responsibility 
and sustainability. According to Gray et al. (1995), corporate social and environmental 
disclosure might be treated as a legitimate and social contribution made by the 
organization.  However, due to imperfect auditing in the real world of economy, 
managers have incentives to take discretionary actions over reported income to maximise 
their own benefit.  Healy and Wahlen (1999: 366) argue that earnings management (EM) 
exists when managers either “mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on 
reported accounting numbers”. 
 
The purpose of the current paper is to investigate the association between corporate 
environmental disclosure (as a measure of corporate social responsibility) and earnings 
management.  In particular, we are interested in answering the following research 
question: “What is the relationship between corporate environmental disclosure (CED) 
and earnings management (EM)?”   
 
Prior research has concentrated either on the relationship between corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) and corporate financial performance (CFP), indicating that financial 
and economic performance of an entity has a positive connection with its social 
responsibility (Ullman, 1985; McGuire et al., 1988; Salama, 2005); or on the association 
between EM and corporate governance (CG), predicting that the reliability and quality of 
accounting earnings will be enhanced when managers’ opportunistic EM behaviour is 
monitored by corporate governance mechanisms (Wild, 1996; Dechow et al., 1996; Klein, 
2002).  In other words, the research has failed to explore the direct link between CSR 
and EM and the impact of CG on the association between the two variables. Only 
recently have Chih et al. (2008) and Prior et al. (2008) empirically identified the exact 
relation between CSR and EM, based on international data.   
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Furthermore, the UK government has recently claimed that environmental reporting is 
deemed to be crucial in corporate reporting and companies must now report essential 
environmental issues in their annual reports and accounts under the amendment of the 
Companies Act 2006. Managers have incentives to voluntarily disclose environmental 
information in order to attract existing or potential investors and to enhance the corporate 
image of their company, especially when they attempt to engage in earnings management.  
Agency conflict exists when managers opportunistically manipulate EM in their own 
favour; hence, CED, which is a means to secure their jobs, can also be used to distract 
shareholders’ attention from monitoring EM activities.  It seems that managers involved 
in EM practice are motivated to behave in a proactive way by seeking perceptions from 
shareholders and diverse groups of stakeholders that they are taking actions to secure 
optimal performance.  Thus, voluntary disclosure in annual reports, such as CED, is 
deemed necessary to demonstrate to stakeholders the company’s awareness of wider 
interests and its accountability to behave in a socially responsible manner. 
 
The rest of our article is organised as follows.  Section 2 critically reviews relevant 
literature, including the relation between CSR and CFP; the relation between EM and CG; 
and a detailed review of the two key papers on the exact association between CSR and 
EM.  Section 3 presents the theoretical framework and the development of the research 
hypotheses.  Section 4 describes sample selection, data collection and the research 
methodology.  Descriptive analysis, correlation analysis and the empirical results are 
reported in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the discussion and provides suggestions for 
further research.   
 
 
2. Literature Review 
Our paper aims to investigate the relationship between corporate environmental 
disclosure (CED) and earnings management (EM). Therefore, we begin our literature 
review by discussing empirical studies that are concerned with the association between 
CSR and CFP and the association between EM and CG. There has been lively research 
since the 1960s on a firm’s CSR coupled with its financial and economic performance.  
Early theoretical research concentrated on the trade-off between CSR and CFP.  
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Bowman and Haire (1975) and Alexander and Bucholtz (1978) argue that firms acting in 
a socially responsible way may give a positive impression to diverse groups of 
stakeholders.  Early stakeholder theory cited that, although CSR activities are very 
costly, firms will obtain reductions in other explicit costs.
1
   
 
Following that, Ullman’s (1985) seminal paper pioneered legitimacy theory in relation to 
powerful stakeholders.  CSR actions and activities are expected to improve relationships 
with shareholders and other groups of stakeholders.  Building a satisfactory reputation 
for the enterprise is strategic to sustaining relationships with different stakeholders and to 
improving access of capital financing; in other words, the financial and economic 
performance of an entity has a positive connection with its social responsibility (Ullmann, 
1985; McGuire et al., 1988; Salama, 2005). 
 
Based on the framework of the relationship between CSR and CFP, there are two types of 
empirical research.  On the one hand, abnormal returns measured as the short-run 
financial impact is used in the event studies.  Notwithstanding the rather mixed 
empirical results, it has been frequently exploited in the 1990s.
2
   
 
On the other hand, scholars and researchers have drawn greater attention to the relation 
between corporate social performance (a measure of CSR) and profitability (a measure of 
long-term firm performance).  For instance, Aupperle et al. (1985) claims that CSR 
actions have neutral effects on profitability.  However, McGuire et al. (1988) find that 
prior return on assets (proxies for profitability) with risks is more closely related to 
corporate social performance than to subsequent performance.
3
  Nevertheless, 
McWilliams and Siegel (2000) conduct the whole firm-level index of CSR regression 
analysis and argue that there is no relationship between CSR and CFP.  Although their 
statement is consistent with Aupperle et al. (1985), they imply that the conflicting 
                                                        
1 See Moskowitz (1972); benefit from employee ethical credibility and reliability will offset minimal costs of CSR. 
2 For example, Posnikoff (1997) finds that CSR activities in terms of divestment from South Africa have enhanced 
shareholder wealth, indicating CSR and its financial performance are positively correlated.  Wright and Ferris (1997) 
report a negative relationship; and Teoh et al. (1999) confirm no relationship between the two variables. 
3 They measure corporate performance in the form of accounting and stock-market-based interpretations in conjunction 
with risk factors. Following that, Waddock and Graves (1997) comment that CSR is in an effect to enhance corporate 
performance. 
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empirical outcomes might result in flaws of measure of CSR.
4
  
 
In addition, managers should use financial reporting to send relevant information about 
the firm’s underlying economic performance to those outside the entity, if they act in the 
interests of the firm performance. However, due to imperfect auditing in the real world of 
economy, managers may have incentives to manage earnings opportunistically.  
Discretionary accruals, therefore, capture the reliability of actual accounting earnings as 
an indicator of a firm’s financial and economic performance.   
 
According to Healy and Wahlen (1999: 366), EM exists when managers either “mislead 
some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to 
influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers”.  In other 
words, due to information asymmetry, managers may engage in earnings management or 
convey information about the firm’s future performance to the insiders (management and 
directors) in the form of financial reporting (Christie and Zimmerman, 1994; Healy and 
Palepu, 1993; Leuz et al., 2003).  
 
It is argued that the reliability and quality of accounting earnings are enhanced when 
managers’ opportunistic manipulation is monitored by corporate governance (Wild, 1996; 
Dechow et al., 1996; Klein 2002).  There are three major factors that influence corporate 
activities with respect to the link between corporate governance (CG) and EM: 
managerial ownership, board composition and audit quality.  
 
Governance regarding the compensation of directors and managers aims to motivate 
managers to behave in the best interests of shareholders and monitoring management 
leads to a reduction of agency conflicts. Looking back to Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) 
agency theory, it is indicated that managers with lower firm ownership have more 
motives to produce reliable accounting earnings that reflect the true economic value of 
the firm. Jensen (1989) additionally predicts that outside directors with little ownership 
stake in the firm have less incentive to constrain managers.  Equity-based compensation 
                                                        
4 Most of the empirical research is limited to the U.S. setting. 
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is a governance device that attempts to reduce its potential to engage in EM.  Warfield et 
al. (1995) also report a negative relationship between stock ownership and abnormal 
accounting accruals
5
.  
 
Conversely, Klein (1998) claims that board compensation has no impact on a firm’s 
performance but suggests that the structure of the committee does have an effect. The 
independence of boards is cited as having a negative association with earnings 
manipulation. The more independent the board, the less likely it is to report abnormal 
earnings.
6
  Consistent with Davidson et al. (1998), Xie et al. (2003) argue that 
independent outside directors are an important mechanism for dealing with agency 
conflicts.  Also, audit committees with financial expertise are expected to have large 
composition should be large enough to effectively monitor EM.
7
   
 
The arguments put forward so far have typically concentrated either on the association 
between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate financial performance (CFP) 
or between corporate governance (CG) and earnings management (EM).  However, 
most of the literature has failed to explain the direct link between CSR and EM and the 
impact of CG on the association between the two variables.  The following paragraphs 
review the key articles on the relationship between CSR and EM. 
 
Recently, empirical studies by Chih et al. (2008) and Prior et al. (2008) have attempted to 
identify the exact link between CSR and EM.  According to Chih et al. (2008), the 
principles of CSR reporting should be providing financial transparency and 
accountability to all levels of stakeholders, provided that EM is detected in terms of CSR 
practices. This is consistent with the view of Prior et al. (2008) that managers engaging in 
earnings manipulations, could compensate by involving in CSR activities.  Given that 
there is informational asymmetry between insiders (managers and directors) and outsiders 
(shareholders and stakeholders); discretional accruals capture the reliability of a firm’s 
financial and economic performance.   
                                                        
5
 Their results have been consistent with the prior theory that managerial shareholding is viewed as an effective 
mechanism in aligning the interests of executives and shareholders. 
6 Klein (2002) also provides evidence with respect to the importance of audit committee.  The independent outside 
directors on audit committee efficiently prevent opportunistic manipulation of the financial reporting process. 
7 They consider earnings management as an agency cost. 
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Additional research on the relation between CSR and EM has contributed to Gelb and 
Strawser’s (2001) examination of the relationship between a firm’s disclosures and CSR.  
The positive association between the two variables indicates that firms undertaking CSR 
actions are more likely to provide extensive and informative disclosures. Motivated by 
the previous relevant research, Chih et al.’s (2008) unique investigation explores, 
empirically, the relationship between CSR and EM with respect to investor protection.   
 
Chih et al. (2008) select a sample of 1,653 companies in 46 countries to examine the 
relationship between CSR and EM.  One group is all companies that issue CSR reports, 
that feature in both the FTSE All-World Developed Index (Global) and the FTSE4Good 
Global Index; and the other is a Non-CSR group, with companies included in the first 
Index but not the latter one. EM has been categorised by three measures: earnings 
aggressiveness, loss avoidance and earnings smoothing.
8
 Chih et al. (2008) argue that 
these three attributes inevitably moderate the relationship between true accounting 
performance and the firm’s underlying economic performance, and that the relationship 
between CSR and EM depends upon which earnings cloudiness managers exploit. 
 
In their econometric model, they investigate whether CSR has an effect on the extent to 
which companies engage in earnings manipulations, so EM is treated as a dependent 
variable and CSR as an explanatory variable.  In order to enhance the reliability of their 
research, some control variables are incorporated in the model: firm size measured by 
total assets; the corporation’s future growth measured by market-to-book ratio; and the 
firm’s leverage measured by debt-to-equity ratio.  The key variable of investor 
protection is used as a proxy for governmental governance, as it has an impact on the 
quality of earnings reporting to the outside stakeholders.  Audit quality, as a dummy 
variable, is also incorporated in the model. 
 
Chih et al. (2008) find that there is a negative relation between EM and CSR when 
earnings smoothing or earnings losses avoidance is an indicator of EM. It predicts that 
                                                        
8 See Bhattacharya, U., H. Daouk and M. Welker (2003) The world price of earnings opacity, The Accounting Review, 
78, pp. 641-678. 
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these CSR companies not only concentrate on income increasing activities but also upon 
stakeholder management.  They conclude that when EM proxies as earnings smoothing, 
firms with more CSR actions are expected to reduce the likelihood of earnings smoothing 
and they argue that this applies even in a poor country.  They also find that large firms 
with better quality audit are more likely to make disclosures rather than to manipulate 
earnings.  
 
However, when EM is measured by earnings aggressiveness, the multiple objectives 
hypothesis holds, which implies a positive relationship between CSR and EM. Further, 
the institutional hypothesis, which states that CSR is unrelated to EM, is rejected, even 
though there are non-ethical incentives to engage in EM, such as “auditor acquiescence 
and growth in equity-based compensation”.9 
 
Chih et al. (2008) make the inconclusive comment that a firm with CSR shows 
considerably less tendency to undertake earnings aggressiveness in a country with strong 
investor protection.  They do not provide a clear answers on the extent to which investor 
protection influences the link between CSR and EM and the role played by the investor 
relationship in companies with both CSR activities and earnings management practices. 
Since other governance attributes have impacts on shareholders’ perception, and 
non-ethical incentives affect the relationship between CSR and EM, additional control 
variables should be incorporated in the econometric model with respect to earnings 
reliability. 
 
Apart from the above literature, Prior et al. (2008) devote considerable attention to 
stakeholder-agency theory and corporate governance.  They provide a different point of 
view in that CSR is treated as a dependent variable in their model, indicating a positive 
association with EM. The hypothesis is that when managers pursue their own benefit in 
opportunistically managing earnings, there are more incentives for them to seek more 
CSR practices.  CSR is an entrenchment strategy to regain support from stakeholders, 
whose interests are damaged by earnings management.  They also incorporate corporate 
                                                        
9  Chih, Hsiang-Lin, Chung-Hua Shen, and Feng-Ching Kang (2008) Corporate social responsibility, investor 
protection, and earnings management: some international evidence, Journal of Business Ethics, 79, pp. 179-198. 
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financial performance (CFP) into the relationship, and argue that the positive relationship 
between CSR and CFP is negatively mitigated when earnings manipulation is included. 
 
Prior et al. (2008), following Healy and Wahlen (1999), identify three incentives for 
earnings management: capital market, contractual arrangements and regulatory 
motivations.  They exploit agency theory and stakeholder theory to explain the 
consequences of earnings management and the connection between CSR and EM. 
Managers may use discretions to affect short-term share prices in the pursuit of 
self-interest benefit; in other words, they may convey private information to the stock 
market about the firm’s future economic performance.  Because managers need to 
safeguard their own job security and also face pressures from other stakeholders, they 
engage in earnings management for their own benefit. Earnings management serves an 
agency cost, resulting from the conflicts between managers and owners and between 
managers and other stakeholders.   
 
They also introduce corporate governance as along with CSR reporting. They believe that 
the strategic use of CSR inevitably enhances perceived legitimacy, reinforces the 
monitoring of the top management and increases the efficacy of the governance system. 
In turn, these factors influence corporate financial performance (Luoma and Goodstein, 
1999).  According to Jensen (2001), when managers act as agents of non-shareholder 
stakeholders, especially when stakeholders share power of corporate control, the strategic 
behavior of CSR can be regarded as an entrenchment initiative as a consequence of 
earnings manipulation. They also argue that a good relationship with different 
stakeholders reinforces corporate financial performance.  However, if firms engage in 
CSR activities as a result of earnings management, the positive impact of CSR on 
corporate financial performance is diminished.  
 
Prior et al. (2008) test their hypotheses using two econometric models: one tests CSR and 
the other tests CFP, with earnings management as the main independent variable.  Their 
data is based upon 593 companies from 26 countries for the year 2002-2004.  In their 
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paper, discretionary accrual
10
 is a proxy for earnings management.  By differentiating 
itself from Jones model
11
, it has enhanced the reliability of inferences in the EM literature.  
Income smoothing, which is defined differently from Chih et al. (2008), is used as a 
different variable to detect earnings management.  CSR is measured as scores from SiRi 
Pro
TM 
data in terms of eight research fields, such as business activities and corporate 
social responsibility actions. They find that CFP is an important control variable when 
examining the association between CSR and EM.  Prior et al. (2008) provide points of 
view that differ from those of Chih et al. (2008).  They argue that when managers act in 
their own favour in opportunistically managing earnings, there are more motives to 
engage in more CSR activities.  In addition, they suggest that CSR is viewed as an 
entrenchment device to garner support from other groups of stakeholders, whose interests 
are damaged by EM practices. Corporate governance (CG) as a monitoring system is a 
strategic mechanism to reinforce or repair organisational legitimacy. Therefore, 
companies are motivated to commit to CSR practices, such as voluntary, corporate , 
social and environmental disclosure reactions; in turn, these will influence corporate 
financial performance.  However, they comment that if firms engage in CSR activities 
as a consequence of earnings manipulation, the positive impact of CSR on CFP will be 
negatively mitigated.  
 
3. Theoretical frameworks and hypotheses development 
Three theoretical perspectives can be used to explain the potential association between 
CED and EM. These include signalling theory, agency theory and stakeholder-legitimacy 
theory.  
 
Signalling theory 
Market efficiency
12
 assumes, to some extent, that, at any given time, investors are 
rational and that prices efficiently incorporate all the available information, depending 
upon a particular stock or market.  Nonetheless, due to information asymmetry between 
management and stakeholders, managers act in their own favour to choose accounting 
                                                        
10 Use module from: Kothari, S. P., Leone, A. J. and Wasley, C. E. (2005) Performance matched discretionary accrual 
measures, Journal of Accounting and economics, 39, pp. 163-197. 
11 Jones, T. M. (1995) Instrumental stakeholder theory: a synthesis of ethics and economics, Academy of Management 
Review, 20, pp. 404-437. 
12 See Market Efficient Hypothesis (EMH) in E. F. Fama: Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and 
Empirical Work, Journal of Finance, 25, pp. 383-417 (May 1970). 
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methods and estimates and, in turn, might conceal the firm’s true economic value.   
 
Prior et al. (2008) argue that managers may adopt discretionary actions to manage 
earnings in an attempt to convey favourable or unfavourable information about the firm’s 
future prospects to the capital markets
13
.  Earnings manipulation can indicate to 
investors the likelihood of better earnings and cash flows in the future.   
 
As a result of market information asymmetry, companies may use corporate financial 
reporting to signal to investors that they hold some favourable information.  Managers 
have incentives to voluntarily disclose additional accounting information as a signal to 
attract existing or potential investors and to enhance positive corporate images, especially 
when they attempt to engage in earnings management.   
 
Gray (2005) comments that a company making corporate environmental disclosure (CED) 
as one of its CSR activities is predominantly concerned with signalling the quality of its 
management.  High quality organisations tend to use corporate social and environmental 
accounting as a diversion to traditional financial reporting; on the other hand, low quality 
organisations choose non-disclosure, consistent with constrained accounting information.  
He further argues that the quality of financial reporting is a signal to financial markets 
and other stakeholders that the management can be perceived as able to control the social 
and environmental risks within the firm.   
 
Additionally, corporate environmental disclosure is signalling to investors and other 
powerful and economic stakeholders that the company is actively taking part in CSR 
practices and that its market value is in a good position.  Good corporate social 
performance helps a company to gain a reputation for reliability from capital markets and 
debt markets.  Earnings management bears certain risks for the firm’s future prospects; 
and outsiders (investors and stakeholders) will take disciplinary action against managers 
if earnings management is substantially detected.  From a manager’s point of view, 
                                                        
13 The opportunity to manage reported earnings captures the firm’s cash flows and changes in corporate market value, 
which are discretionary from current cash flows. 
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corporate environmental disclosure is a signal that deflects shareholders’ attention from 
issues on which managers might be punished.  
 
Agency theory 
 
It is argued that there are a number of overlaps between signalling theory and agency 
theory as a consequence of significant similarities between the two theories
14
.  Agency 
theory explains further signalling perspectives.  Agency conflict exists when managers 
(agents) undertake opportunistic actions, such as earnings management, to maximise their 
own interests.  Managerial actions can mislead stakeholders about the firm’s corporate 
market value and financial position, and cause outsiders to make false economic 
decisions.  Earnings management is, therefore, an agency cost. (Zahra et al., 2005 and 
Xie et al., 2003)   
 
On the other hand, Dechow et al. (1996) claim that when earnings management is 
suspected, the firm’s value will immediately be reduced on stock market.  Hence, EM 
can have an effect on a firm’s share price, and in turn, share price will be damaged as a 
consequence of earnings management disclosed in more transparent reporting.  Agency 
theory suggests that firms may use different methods, such as compensation plans or 
voluntary disclosures, to reduce conflicting interests between managers and shareholders.  
CSR requires a company to be accountable to its multi-levels of stakeholders and to 
report sustainability for business development on a voluntary basis.  CED, as a CSR 
action, is a signal which can aim to divert shareholders’ attention from monitoring 
earnings manipulation to other issues, and share price will be enhanced as a result.   
 
Managers are interested in short-term business performance, so they expect to achieve a 
positive share price effect.  Furthermore, regarding CED, a satisfactory corporate 
reputation and improved relationships with different stakeholders can be converted into 
access to capital financing (McGuire, 1988).  Since, it is argued, building a satisfactory 
reputation is strategic to managing shareholders’ impressions, investment in a good 
enterprise reputation may reinforce a firm’s competitive advantage and, thus, maximise 
                                                        
14 See R. D. Morris (1987) Signalling, agency theory and accounting policy choice, Accounting and Business Research, 
18 (4), pp. 47-56. 
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shareholders wealth.  It will additionally lead to retain superior profits in capital markets 
(Salama, 2005).  
 
CSR activities provide a more accurate risk assessment for investors and this, in turn, will 
give access to external financing at the possible lowest cost.  As attractions of potential 
shareholders through the increased transparency of information, the company is likely to 
be in a more healthy and liquid position in stock markets.  In other words, managers 
involved in earnings manipulations can be expected to make more corporate 
environmental disclosures in an attempt to pursue their own benefit. 
 
Stakeholder-legitimacy theory 
Stakeholder theory explains the relationship between stakeholders and the information 
they receive.  Managers can be employed not only as the owner’s agent but also as an 
agent of other stakeholders (Hill and Jones, 1992).  Managers can take certain EM 
actions in an attempt to obtain personal gains at the expense of other stakeholders.  
Nonetheless, stakeholders will respond to management in case their own interests are 
damaged by EM practices.  Thus, managers may have incentives to use their controls to 
make financial reports more informative and extensive, so as to minimise threats of being 
dismissed.   
 
Ullman’s (1985) seminal paper has pioneered legitimacy theory in relation to powerful 
stakeholders.  There are two perspectives on corporate social responsibility activities: 
first, it builds a positive image among stakeholders and gains support and trust from 
diverse groups of stakeholders; secondly, it has a positive impact on corporate reputation 
and brings economic benefit from the strategic perspective.  CSR activities are expected 
to improve relationships with shareholders, suppliers, creditors and other groups of 
stakeholders.  In other words, the financial and economic performance of an entity has a 
positive connection with its social responsibility (Salama, 2005). 
   
In line with Gray et al. (1995), information disclosed to the stakeholders might be 
regarded as a legitimate social contribution made by the organization.  Managers 
engaged in earnings management tend to realise that voluntary environmental disclosures 
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can be used to maintain organisational legitimacy, especially with social and political 
stakeholders.  CED initiatives provide a channel to inform stakeholders of the firm’s 
wider interests and of its accountability to behave in a socially responsible manner.  On 
the other hand, legitimacy management can be viewed as a way of communicating, 
within the organisation-society relationship, to obtain societal support.  Managers, who 
have control of the decision making process, have incentives to use such strategies to 
fulfill the expectations of other groups of stakeholders.  Hence, it is argued, the 
motivation for corporate social and environmental disclosures is to deflect stakeholders’ 
attention from detection EM.  
 
It seems that managers involved in EM are motivated to behave in a positive way to seek 
perceptions from shareholders and diverse groups of stakeholders that they are acting to 
assure optimal performance.  Alternatively, organisations with a low level of EM are 
less likely to promote CED initiatives.  Based on the above discussion, our main and 
first hypothesis is formulated as follows:   
 
Hypothesis 1: Firms that engage in earnings management have incentives to undertake 
CSR initiatives such as corporate environmental disclosure (CED). 
 
Prior research offers evidence that the reliability and the quality of accounting earnings is 
enhanced when managerial opportunistic behaviour is monitored by corporate 
governance mechanisms (Klein, 2002). Thereby, governance will be improved due to the 
reduction of agency conflicts. From an agency perspective, a larger board is an effective 
mechanism in monitoring managers.  Jensen (1993) suggests that board size is 
negatively related to the ability of the board to pursue long term strategic goals.  
Nonetheless, increased board size leads to more experienced independent directors (Xie 
et al., 2003), so it is likely to diminish managers’ opportunistic manipulation such as 
earnings management by diverting attention to corporate social responsibilities.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Board size is positively related to CSR activities. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Board size will moderate the relationship between earnings management 
and corporate social responsibility; the greater the board size, the lesser the positive 
effect of earnings management on corporate social responsibility. 
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Ebrahim (2007) examines the relation between earnings management and the activity of 
both the board and the audit committee.  Using a sample of US manufacturing companies 
for two years 1999 and 2000, he finds that earnings management, as measured by the 
modified Jones model, is negatively related to both board and audit committee 
independence and he documents that this relation is stronger when the audit committee is 
more active. Xie et al. (2003) also argue that an active audit committee is expected to 
have a large composition to effectively monitor discretionary current accruals.   
Both studies used audit committee meeting frequency as a proxy for the level of audit 
committee activities, and indicate that the number of audit committee meetings is 
negatively associated with earnings management. Based on the above discussion, we 
formulate the fourth and fifth hypotheses as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Number of audit committee meetings is positively related to CSR activities. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Number of audit committee meetings will moderate the relationship 
between earnings management and corporate social responsibility; the greater the 
number of audit committee meetings, the lesser is the positive effect of earnings 
management on corporate social responsibility. 
 
4. Research method 
Sample 
The sample for this research is retrieved from the second review of environmental 
reporting in the annual reports and accounts of companies in the FTSE All-share Index 
for the year ending 31 March 2007.  The FTSE All-share, as one of the FTSE UK 
indices, is designed to represent 98-99% of the UK equity market.  The second report is 
published by the UK’s Environment Agency Trucost.  It examines corporate 
environmental disclosures on waste, water, climate change (and energy use), and the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme in companies’ annual reports and accounts.  We exclude 
financial companies (i.e. insurance, banks, and investments funds) and utilities companies 
because of the unique characteristics of their financial statements. Financial data is 
collected for FTSE All-share non-financial companies from Thomson Database.  This 
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database contains all the key financial items derived from company balance sheets, 
income statements and cash flow statements.  Control variables such as the total number 
of board committee members and the number of audit committee meetings are manually 
collected from each company’s annual report. Firms with missing data are removed from 
the analysis. This gives us a final sample of 245 firms for the year between 1 April 2006 
and 31 March 2007.  
 
Measurement of variables 
Dependent variable- corporate environmental disclosure 
Prior research has used many proxies for CSR. Content analysis is the most frequently 
used method to measure corporate social and environmental disclosures as a proxy for 
CSR.  It is used to codify the content (or text) of writing into various categories on the 
basis of essential criteria.
15
  Disclosures are broadly classified into environmental, 
employee, community and customer disclosures.
16
 As illustrated in Prior et al. (2008), 
the scores are rated by SiRi Pro
TM, according to a firm’s responsibility to different groups 
of stakeholders.   
 
In our paper, CED will be adopted as a measure of CSR.  The UK government has 
recently claimed that environmental reporting is a significant element of corporate 
reporting.  Under the amendment of the Companies Act 2006, companies must now 
report on essential environmental issues within the Business Review or Operating and 
Financial Review (OFR) in their annual reports and accounts. Companies are required to 
employ the UK Government’s Environmental Key Performance Indicators (KPI) - 
Reporting Guidelines for UK Business.  Companies need to disclose quantitative 
environmental information for most of its recommended KPIs such as waste, water and 
energy use including climate change.  The numbers relating to the core KPIs disclosed 
in accordance with Government Guidelines are as follows: 
0: No Quantification; 
1: General Quantification; 
2: Data that could be derived to meet Government Guidelines; 
                                                        
15 See Webber, R. P. (1988) Basic content analysis, Sage University Paper Series on Quantitative Applications in the 
Social Sciences, Series No. 07-049, Sage, Beverly Hills, CA, and London.   
16 CSEAR (The Centre for Social and Environmental Disclosure Database) is also based upon a content analysis of the 
social and environmental disclosures in the annual reports of the UK companies. 
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3: Disclosure that meets Government Guidelines. 
 
Independent variable 
Earnings management  
Earnings management measured by discretionary accruals has been pioneered by Healy 
since 1985.  Healy (1985: 89) explains that non-discretionary accruals are “the 
adjustments to the cash flows mandated by the accounting standard-setting bodies”, 
whereas discretionary accruals are “adjustments to cash flows selected by the manager”.  
Recent research on EM focuses on an analysis of discretionary accruals.
17
 
 
The most widely used method to measure discretionary accruals in the literature 
are the Jones (1991) and the modified Jones (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995) 
models. However, Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) argue that measuring 
discretionary accruals without controlling for firm performance will produce 
misspecification in the EM model, therefore they propose a model that includes an 
intercept and control for the firm performance using Return on Assets (ROA) to 
mitigate the problematic heteroskedasticity and mis-specified issues that exist in 
other aggregate accruals models. As many recent studies e.g. Changa, et al. (2010) 
and Cornett, et al.(2009). This study uses Kothari et al. (2005) performance adjusted 
discretionary accruals model with a two-digit SIC code to estimate the discretionary 
accruals. 
 
Total accruals (TAit) are measured by the difference between net income (NIit) and net 
cash flows from operating activities (CFOit) as follows: TAit = NIit- CFOit.  
Discretionary accrual (DAit), which is the proxy to detect EM, is the residuals of the 
following model: 
 
TAit/ Ait-1= αi[1/Ait-1]+β1i[(∆REVit-∆RECit)/ Ait-1]+ β2i[PPEit/ Ait-1]+ β3i[ROAit/ Ait-1]+ εit 
Where: 
                                                        
17 See Jones (1991) model.  He addresses that depreciation and change in working capital are the major components 
of the total accruals.  Gross Property, plant and equipment (PPE) is used to measure the level of amortisation.  
Change in turnover is supposed to explain change in working capital net of short term depreciation. 
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TAit the total accruals of firm i in year t 
∆REVit the change in revenues of firm i between years t and t-1 
∆RECit the change in receivables of firm i between years t and t-1 
PPEit the level of gross property, plant, and equipment of firm i in year t 
ROAit Return on Assets of firm i in year t. 
Ait-1 the total assets of firm i at the end of year t-1 
 
 
Finally, since managers might have incentives to engage in either income-increasing or 
income-decreasing earnings management, we use unsigned (absolute value of) abnormal 
accruals as a proxy for the mixed effect of upward or downward earnings.
18
 
 
In addition to applying Kothari et al. (2005) model of estimating discretionary accruals, 
this study also applies the same model using only the current accruals instead of long 
term accruals. Becker et al (1998) suggest that management have greater discretion over 
current accruals than long-term accruals.  
 
Control variables 
Corporate governance attributes are important as a signal to the shareholders of the level 
of EM behavior; and they also have impacts on the degree of earnings reliability 
(Dechow et al., 1996).  In our paper, we use board size as a measure of corporate 
governance to indicate the effect of EM on CSR.  Shareholders have incentives to 
perceive large boards as having greater monitoring competence over managers’ 
discretionary accounting choices.
19
 Klein et al. (2002) argue that the role of board audit 
committee is to monitor the firm’s financial reporting process and to resolve conflicts 
between internal financial managers and outside auditors.  Audit committee meeting 
frequency is used as a proxy for the level of audit committee activities, as in Xie et al. 
(2003).   
 
Given that corporate governance is not the unique factor in influencing opportunistic 
                                                        
18 Other earnings management studies have used this measure; see Warfield et al. (1995), DeFond and Park (1997) and 
Bartov et al. (2000). 
19 Relevant prior studies regarding board size: see Xie et al. (2003) and Dechow et al. (1996). 
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earnings manipulation, firm size, profitability, and financial leverage are incorporated as 
controls, since these variables may influence discretionary accruals, as indicated by 
previous studies (e.g. Xie et al., 2003 and Press and Weintrop, 1990).  We follow the 
specification shown in Prior et al. (2008), Chih et al. (2008) and Hackston and Milne 
(1996).  Firm size is measured by total assets.  Debt-to-equity ratio is used to measure 
a firm’s leverage, as it is an indicator of the firm’s financial structure. Profitability is 
measured using the accounting-based return on assets. 
 
Method 
Our main research hypothesis is that firms that engage in earnings management have 
more incentives to undertake corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives, such as 
corporate environmental disclosures (CED).  In order to explain CED and investigate 
the expected positive relationship, we use the following Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
regression with robust standard errors on a basis of cross-sectional analysis: 
 
CEDit=λ1+λ2(DA)it+λ3(Size)it+λ4(LEV)it+λ5(ROA)it+λ6(CG)it+λ7(AUDIT)it+λ8(INDUST
RY)it+εit                                                        [1] 
 
Where: 
Earnings management (DA) Absolute performance adjusted discretionary accruals 
Size (SIZE) Total assets 
Leverage (LEV) Debt-to-equity ratio 
Profitability (ROA) Return on Total Assets 
Corporate governance (CG) Board size i.e. total number of board committee members 
Audit (AUDIT) Total number of audit committee meetings 
Industry (INDUSTRY) 
Indicator, 1 for regulated sectors, and 0 for unregulated 
sectors 
 
 
 
Additionally, industry sector is considered as a dummy variable in an attempt to test 
whether it is effective in explaining the effect of earnings management on CED.  As 
reported in Trucost’s second review of environmental reporting in 2007, Industry 
Classification Benchmark (ICB), industry sectors are comprised of financials, industries, 
consumer services, consumer goods, oil & gas, health care, basic materials, technology, 
utilities, and telecommunications.  As mentioned before, we exclude financial and 
utilities firms. Then, following Prior et al. (2008), we classify industry sectors into two 
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groups: regulated and unregulated sectors. Regulated sectors (i.e. oil & gas, health care, 
technology and telecommunications) are given a dummy value of 1; a value of 0 is given 
to the other sectors (the unregulated sectors). Robust regression for the regulated sectors 
is also conducted in the paper. 
 
5. Results 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 represents descriptive statistics.  Corporate environmental disclosure (CED) is 
calculated as number of core KPIs disclosed with respect to Government Guidelines.  It 
shows that the minimum score is 0 out of 3, and the mean score is 0.278.  Discretionary 
accrual as a proxy for earnings management has a mean value of around .06, which is 
comparable with the findings of prior studies such as .06 for Canadian companies and .03 
for French companies, as reported by Othman and Zeghal (2006).  The total number of 
board committee members has a mean value of 9 on a scale between 4 and 19 while the 
number of audit committee meetings ranges from is 2 to 14.  Remarkably, the standard 
deviations of SIZE and LEVERAGE are the highest of the seven independent variables; 
hence they represent the widest dispersion of these values.  Normality tests of these 
variables are provided in the following analysis.   
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
Correlation analysis 
Table 2 presents the correlation analysis. It shows that the variations in DA are positively 
correlated with variations in CED (1.77%).  The positive relationship between firm size 
and corporate environmental disclosure is consistent with prior research.  Large 
companies are expected to make more CED as a consequence of accountability and 
visibility to legitimise their business (Cormier and Gordon, 2001; Carven and Marston, 
1999).  It is notable that variations in board size are positively correlated with variations 
in both firm size and the number of audit committee meetings, suggesting that large firms 
have large boards. It also shows that, as the size of the board increases, the more active 
the audit committee becomes. ROA shows the highest correlation with DA at 40%, which 
enhances the argument that it is important to consider firm performance when measuring 
the discretionary accruals.  
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Insert Table 2 here 
 
OLS regression with robust standard errors 
Table 3A provides the OLS regression with robust standard errors, and corporate 
environmental disclosure (CED) is regarded as the dependent variable and earnings 
management (DA) and other control variables are considered as the independent 
variables.   
 
 CED is unrelated to DA (true for both long-term and current DA) since its p value in both 
models is about 0.67 with a robust standard error around 0.66 
20
.  Similarly, financial 
leverage, return on assets and board size are also unrelated.  The number of audit 
committee meetings is also unrelated to CED.  However, firm size has a positive 
coefficient that is significant at the 0.01 level.  This is consistent with the prior studies 
that reported that large companies are likely to face an increased pressure from external 
groups and they may undertake more CSR activities (e.g. corporate environmental 
disclosures) for the sake of external funds. We also find that industry sector, as a dummy 
variable, is negatively related to CED. 
 
Insert Table 3A here 
 
Managers may have motives to manage either income-increasing or income-decreasing 
earnings; hence in regression [1] following prior studies on EM, we comparably use 
absolute value of both long term and current discretionary accruals as a proxy of the issue 
of both upward and downward earnings management.  As noted in Table 3A, the 
corporate environmental disclosure (CED) variable is also insignificantly associated with 
neither directions of positive nor negative absolute value of discretionary and current 
accruals, though it converts into a positive relationship with negative DA.   
 
 Number of audit committee meetings is related to CED in the singed discretionary 
accruals samples, audit committee meetings seems to positively impact the CED when 
managers imply upward EM practice while it has a negative effect on CED in firms with 
                                                        
20 Robust standard errors exist if they are autocorrelated or heteroskedastic.  
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downward EM. This is in line with previous findings that suggest audit committees have 
different effect based on the type and directions of EM, which in turn may have reflected 
in the relationship between audit committee number of meetings and CED.  
 
In the signed DA test, the firm size is not significant in the signed discretionary accruals 
models but remain significant in the current discretionary accruals models. This result 
raises the question of the possible effect of the type of EM strategy on the relationship 
between CED and firm size. The relationship between CED and industry type remain 
significantly negative in most of the tested models. 
 
     Insert Table 3B and 3C here 
 
Following Myers and Omer (2003), we also tested the raw discretionary accruals. Panel 
(D) shows that raw long term discretionary accruals and raw current discretionary 
accruals have no significant effect on CED. In addition, neither board size, nor audit 
committee diligence is significantly associated with CED. However, firm size and 
industry type still show significant associations with CED in these models. 
 
Insert Table 3D here 
 
In order to test hypotheses three and five of the moderating role of corporate governance 
in the relationship between DA and CSR, we introduce two interaction variables of large 
boards with earnings management, and active audit committee with earnings 
management.  
 
We employ the following cross-sectional regression model, which includes the interaction 
terms of corporate governance attributes and earnings management: 
 
 
CED = b0 + b1 EM + b2 EM*CG + b3 EM*AUDIT + bj Control Variables j + e  
Where:  
EM = performance-matched discretionary accruals, measured in absolute, positive, 
and negative values 
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EM*CG is an interaction term between the DA variable and the BOARDSIZE 
dummy variable 
EM*AUDIT is an interaction term between the DA variable and the AUDIT 
dummy variable 
 
 
The results in Table 4 (Panel: A) show that the coefficient for board size is significantly 
negative at .10 level, whereas the coefficient for the interaction term EM*CG is positive 
(coef = .47 with t = 2.9, p= . In contrast, the coefficient for audit committee is 
significantly positive at .05 level, whereas for the interaction term EM*AUDIT is 
negative (coef = -0.39 with t = -2, 18, p = 5).  
  
Table 4 (Panel: A) 
 
When the interaction effect between EM and corporate governance variables are included 
within the regression model, the effect of board size and audit committee becomes 
statistically significant, whereas the interaction effect is highly significant. These results 
also provide support for Hypothesis 2 concerning the negative moderating effect of audit 
committee in the relationship between earnings management practices and CED. Even 
though, this research has not documented a direct effect of the earnings management 
variable on CED, we provide evidence of the importance of considering the interaction 
and joint effect of earnings management and corporate governance variables on CED.  
 
Furthermore, when we replace the absolute EM measure with signed EM measures (DA+ 
and DA-) in table 4 panel (B) to test the moderating role of corporate governance 
attributes in the relationship between signed DA and CSR, the findings are similar in the 
negative DA sample. However, in the positive DA sample, there is no significant 
interaction effect in both EM*CG and EM*AUDIT. This is may be due to the relatively 
small sample in this group or the weak effect of both board size and audit committee in 
effecting positive DA that is also found in the previous analysis.  
 
        Table 4 panel (B) 
 
Robustness check 
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In the main test, the relationship between CED and DA is insignificant; this finding might 
be reflected when all the seven independent variables are included simultaneously.  In 
order to check outliers of these variables, a normality test is conducted in Table (5).  
Considering the number of observations, the probability of Chi^2 being higher than 
140.169 is 0.5% (see statistic table).  Therefore, SIZE, LEVERAGE and AUDIT are 
found to be not normally distributed.  A cross-sectional analysis using regression [2], is 
run after dropping these three variables from the initial model.   
 
CEDit=λ1+λ2(EM)it+ +λ3(ROA)it+λ4(CG)it +λ5(INDUSTRY)it+εit  [2] 
           
The results in table (5) are qualitatively similar to the main regression results of no 
significant relationship between DA and CED, however, there is a positive significant 
relationship between board size and CED. 
 
Insert Table 5 here 
 
Following Prior et al. (2008), we run robust regression for the regulated and unregulated 
industries sectors and find that the  p value of ROA and leverage are significant at .01 
and 0.05 levels respectively (see Table 6).  Nevertheless, regulated industries sectors 
results indicate a positive and significant relationship between firm size and CED.  
Table (6) also shows that the relation between CED and EM is still insignificant in both 
regulated and unregulated industries sectors. These results indicate that the impact of firm 
size, leverage and ROA on CED are different based on industries sectors’ characteristics, 
whereas CED and EM are not related regardless the sector type. 
 
Insert Table 6 here 
 
6. Conclusions 
The aim of this article is to identify the association between corporate environmental 
disclosure (CED) and earnings management (EM) and the main hypothesis is that firms 
practising EM might have incentives to undertake CSR initiatives such as corporate 
environmental disclosure (CED).  
  
We use the UK Government’s Environmental Key Performance Indicators (KPI) for the 
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year ending 31 March 2007, as reported by Trucost, a respected environmental research 
company.  Performance adjusted discretionary accruals model (Kothari. et al, 2005) is 
used to capture discretionary accruals as a measure of EM.  We find insignificant 
association between CED and EM, when we run Ordinary Least Square (OLS) with 
robust errors. And this result is counterintuitive, even when some variables that are not 
normally distributed have been removed from the regression model.   
 
In essence, managers are in a control of decision making processes, they are motivated to 
engage in either income-increasing or income-decreasing EM for their own benefit.  
Given that we comparably use absolute value of discretionary accruals, signed accruals 
and raw accruals for both long term accruals and current accruals as proxies for the mixed 
effect of earnings manipulation, and hence find insignificant relationship between CED 
and EM.   
 
We also examined the interaction effect of corporate governance variables namely board 
size and audit committee diligence on the relationship between EM and CED. We find 
that audit committee diligence but not board size, effect the relationship between EM and 
CED. Thus, other corporate governance mechanisms (i.e. board composition and 
sub-committees characteristics) need to be considered in the future research as factors 
that may influence the relationship between EM and CED.   
 
Robust regression is a confirmatory method in econometric models.  More specifically, 
additional robustness check shows an insignificant association between CED and EM in 
regulated and unregulated industries.  Despite that, firm size as a control variable is 
significantly positively related to CED.  This is consistent with previous disclosure 
studies that report that large companies are likely to face an increased pressure from 
external groups and they may undertake more CSR activities for the sake of external 
funds. Another explanation for the association is that large companies are expected to 
make more corporate environmental disclosures (CED) as a consequence of 
accountability and visibility to legitimise their business (Cormier and Gordon, 2001; 
Carven and Marston, 1999). 
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   Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Mean Median Std.Dev Max Min 
CED 0.278 0.000 0.727 3.000 0.000 
DA 0.064 0.047 0.064 0.534 0.000 
SIZE 3.581 0.618 13.628 126.598 0.034 
LEVERAGE 92.317 44.620 248.876 3027.140 -679.370 
ROA 7.147 7.770 10.673 38.580 -75.650 
BOARDSIZE 9.420 9.000 2.685 19.000 4.000 
AUDIT 3.698 4.000 1.289 14.000 2.000 
INDUSTRY 0.216 0.000 0.413 1.000 0.000 
 CED DA SIZE LEVERAGE ROA BOARDSIZE AUDIT INDUSTRY 
         
CED 1 
       
DA -0.043 1 
      
SIZE 0.1507 0.0265 1 
     
LEVERAGE -0.0651 0.0526 -0.0225 1 
    
ROA -0.0412 -0.4083 0.0047 0.0402 1 
   
BOARDSIZE 0.1121 -0.008 0.4865 0.1151 0.0319 1 
  
AUDIT 0.1378 -0.0085 0.4 0.0199 0.0637 0.3031 1 
 
INDUSTRY -0.078 0.4046 0.1955 0.0992 -0.1642 0.1432 0.1233 1 
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      Table 3: Regression estimates of CED on DA with robust standard errors 
 
Panel (A): Absolute Value Measures 
Variable Discretionary Long Term Accruals Current Accruals 
CED Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 95% Conf. Interval] Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 95% Conf. Interval] 
DA -0.300 0.700 -0.430 0.669 -1.680 1.080 -0.295 0.666 -0.440 0.659 -1.607 1.017 
SIZE 0.006 0.002 2.440 0.015 0.001 0.010 0.006 0.002 2.480 0.014 0.001 0.010 
LEVERAGE 0.000 0.000 -1.010 0.312 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -1.000 0.317 0.000 0.000 
ROA -0.005 0.004 -1.270 0.205 -0.013 0.003 -0.005 0.004 -1.260 0.208 -0.014 0.003 
BOARDSIZE 0.015 0.016 0.910 0.362 -0.017 0.047 0.015 0.016 0.910 0.364 -0.017 0.047 
AUDIT 0.055 0.048 1.160 0.245 -0.038 0.149 0.055 0.048 1.150 0.252 -0.039 0.149 
INDUSTRY -0.204 0.111 -1.840 0.067 -0.421 0.014 -0.210 0.103 -2.040 0.043 -0.412 -0.007 
_cons 0.027 0.182 0.150 0.884 -0.332 0.385 0.029 0.185 0.160 0.875 -0.336 0.394 
             
Number of obs 245 
     
Number of obs 245 
 
 
  
F(  7,   237) 4.590 
     
F(  7,   237) 4.600 
 
 
  
Prob > F 0.000 
     
Prob > F 0.000 
 
 
  
R-squared 0.053 
     
R-squared 0.053 
 
 
  
Root MSE 0.718 
     
Root MSE 0.718 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
       
 
    Table 3: Regression estimates of CED on DA with robust standard errors 
 
 
Panel (B): Signed Measures (Discretionary Long Term Accruals) 
 
CED Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 95% Conf. Interval] CED Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
DA- -0.212 0.616 -0.340 0.731 -1.429 1.004 DA+ 2.176 3.152 0.690 0.493 -4.131 2.176 
SIZE 0.004 0.003 1.600 0.112 -0.001 0.009 SIZE 0.033 0.030 1.110 0.273 -0.027 0.033 
LEVERAGE 0.000 0.000 -0.650 0.514 0.000 0.000 LEVERAGE -0.001 0.000 -2.110 0.039 -0.002 -0.001 
ROA -0.005 0.005 -0.920 0.357 -0.015 0.005 ROA -0.019 0.010 -1.920 0.060 -0.038 -0.019 
BOARDSIZE 0.009 0.018 0.480 0.634 -0.027 0.044 BOARDSIZE 0.043 0.051 0.840 0.405 -0.059 0.043 
AUDIT 0.101 0.055 1.830 0.070 -0.008 0.211 AUDIT -0.161 0.053 -3.040 0.004 -0.266 -0.161 
INDUSTRY -0.197 0.120 -1.650 0.101 -0.433 0.039 INDUSTRY -0.588 0.203 -2.900 0.005 -0.994 -0.588 
_cons -0.091 0.222 -0.410 0.681 -0.529 0.346 _cons 0.521 0.446 1.170 0.247 -0.371 0.521 
       
 
      
No of obs 178 
     
No of obs 67 
  
 
 
67 
F(  7,   237) 3.140 
     
F(  7,  237) 1.660 
  
 
 
1.660 
Prob > F 0.004 
     
Prob > F 0.136 
  
 
 
0.136 
R-squared 0.076 
     
R-squared 0.115 
  
 
 
0.115 
Root MSE 0.696 
     
Root MSE 0.775 
  
 
 
0.775 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
       
      Table 3: Regression estimates of CED on DA with robust standard errors 
 
 
Panel (C): Signed Measures (Current Accruals) 
 
CED Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 95% Conf. Interval] CED Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
DA- -0.737 0.648 -1.140 0.257 -2.016 0.541 DA+ 0.864 2.666 0.320 0.747 -4.461 6.189 
SIZE 0.007 0.003 2.400 0.018 0.001 0.013 SIZE 0.009 0.004 2.570 0.012 0.002 0.017 
LEVERAGE 0.000 0.000 -0.760 0.449 0.000 0.000 LEVERAGE -0.001 0.000 -2.250 0.028 -0.001 0.000 
ROA -0.007 0.005 -1.480 0.142 -0.017 0.002 ROA 0.001 0.006 0.140 0.887 -0.012 0.014 
BOARDSIZE 0.013 0.018 0.700 0.486 -0.024 0.049 BOARDSIZE 0.016 0.039 0.410 0.684 -0.062 0.093 
AUDIT 0.110 0.073 1.500 0.136 -0.035 0.254 AUDIT -0.030 0.046 -0.650 0.520 -0.121 0.062 
INDUSTRY -0.235 0.126 -1.870 0.064 -0.483 0.013 INDUSTRY -0.185 0.180 -1.030 0.307 -0.544 0.174 
_cons -0.076 0.268 -0.290 0.776 -0.605 0.452 _cons 0.165 0.282 0.580 0.562 -0.399 0.728 
       
 
      
No of obs 173 
     
No of obs 72 
  
 
  
F(  7,   237) 3.340 
     
F(  7,  237) 4.370 
  
 
  
Prob > F 0.002 
     
Prob > F 0.001 
  
 
  
R-squared 0.067 
     
R-squared 0.089 
  
 
  
Root MSE 0.761 
     
Root MSE 0.613 
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      Table 3: Regression estimates of CED on DA with robust standard errors 
 
 
 
Panel (D): Raw Measures 
 
Variable              Raw long Term Discretionary Accruals Raw Current Accruals 
CED Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
DA 0.073 0.559 0.130 0.896 -1.028 1.174 -0.113 0.499 -0.230 0.821 -1.096 0.870 
SIZE 0.006 0.002 2.440 0.015 0.001 0.010 0.006 0.002 2.420 0.016 0.001 0.010 
LEVERAGE 0.000 0.000 -1.030 0.304 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -1.060 0.290 0.000 0.000 
ROA -0.005 0.004 -1.160 0.249 -0.013 0.003 -0.004 0.004 -1.020 0.310 -0.013 0.004 
BOARDSIZE 0.015 0.016 0.930 0.352 -0.017 0.048 0.015 0.016 0.930 0.355 -0.017 0.047 
AUDIT 0.055 0.048 1.160 0.247 -0.038 0.149 0.056 0.048 1.180 0.238 -0.037 0.150 
INDUSTRY -0.214 0.111 -1.940 0.054 -0.432 0.004 -0.224 0.101 -2.220 0.027 -0.423 -0.025 
_cons 0.007 0.181 0.040 0.969 -0.350 0.364 -0.003 0.184 -0.020 0.988 -0.365 0.359 
             
Number of obs 245 
     
Number of obs 245 
 
 
  
F(  7,   237) 4.620 
     
F(  7,   237) 4.690 
 
 
  
Prob > F 0.000 
     
Prob > F 0.000 
 
 
  
R-squared 0.052 
     
R-squared 0.052 
 
 
  
Root MSE 0.719 
     
Root MSE 0.719 
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Table 4: Panel (A) Regression of the interaction effect of corporate governance attributes on the relationship of absolute DA 
and CSR 
 
CED Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
DA (absolute) -0.324 0.705 -0.460 0.646 -1.714 1.065 
EMCG 0.294 0.122 2.410 0.017 0.054 0.535 
EMAUD -0.202 0.112 -1.800 0.074 -0.424 0.019 
BOARDSIZE -0.025 0.022 -1.150 0.253 -0.067 0.018 
AUDIT 0.103 0.063 1.630 0.104 -0.021 0.228 
SIZE 0.008 0.003 2.910 0.004 0.003 0.013 
LEVERAGE 0.000 0.000 -0.900 0.367 0.000 0.000 
ROA -0.005 0.004 -1.150 0.252 -0.014 0.004 
INDUSTRY -0.238 0.106 -2.240 0.026 -0.447 -0.028 
_cons -0.324 0.705 -0.460 0.646 -1.714 1.065 
       
Number of obs 245 
     
F(  9,   163) 2.76 
     
Prob > F 0.0044 
     
R-squared 0.0788 
     
Root MSE 0.71147 
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Table 4: Panel (B) The interaction effect of corporate governance attributes on the relationship of signed DA and CSR 
 
CED Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 95% conf. Interval CED Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 95% conf. Interval 
DA - -0.400 0.599 -0.670 0.505 -1.583 0.783 DA+ 1.471 3.261 0.450 0.654 -5.048 7.990 
EMCG 0.367 0.145 2.540 0.012 0.081 0.653 EMCG -0.015 0.181 -0.080 0.934 -0.376 0.346 
EMAUD -0.247 0.134 -1.850 0.066 -0.512 0.017 EMAUD -0.070 0.135 -0.520 0.605 -0.340 0.199 
BOARDSIZ -0.041 0.025 -1.630 0.105 -0.090 0.009 BOARDSIZ 0.015 0.046 0.320 0.752 -0.077 0.106 
AUDIT 0.160 0.077 2.070 0.040 0.008 0.313 AUDIT -0.012 0.053 -0.240 0.815 -0.118 0.093 
SIZE 0.007 0.003 1.970 0.050 0.000 0.013 SIZE 0.009 0.004 2.450 0.017 0.002 0.017 
LEVERAGE 0.000 0.000 -0.540 0.587 0.000 0.000 LEVERAGE -0.001 0.000 -2.180 0.033 -0.001 0.000 
ROA -0.005 0.005 -0.960 0.339 -0.015 0.005 ROA 0.001 0.007 0.070 0.946 -0.014 0.015 
INDUSTRY -0.210 0.112 -1.880 0.062 -0.430 0.011 INDUSTRY -0.206 0.186 -1.110 0.273 -0.577 0.166 
_cons -0.002 0.244 -0.010 0.995 -0.484 0.481 _cons 0.164 0.336 0.490 0.627 -0.507 0.835 
       
 
      
       
 
      
No of obs 178 
     
No of obs 72 
  
 
  
F( 7, 237) 2.000 
     
F( 7, 237) 7.370 
  
 
  
Prob > F 0.042 
     
Prob > F 0.000 
  
 
  
R-squared 0.120 
     
R-squared 0.094 
  
 
  
Root MSE 0.683 
     
Root MSE 0.622 
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Table (5) Excluding outliers and non normally distributed variables. 
 
CED Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
DA (absolute) -0.387 0.737 -0.530 0.600 -1.839 1.065 
BOARDSIZE 0.035 0.015 2.350 0.020 0.006 0.064 
ROA -0.005 0.004 -1.210 0.226 -0.013 0.003 
INDUSTRY -0.167 0.116 -1.440 0.150 -0.395 0.061 
_cons 0.049 0.144 0.340 0.734 -0.235 0.334 
       
Number of obs 245 
     
F(  4,   240) 2.020 
     
Prob > F 0.092 
     
R-squared 0.026 
     
Root MSE 0.724 
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Table (6): Robustness Regression of Different Sectors 
 
Variable                Unregulated sectors  Regulated sectors  
CED Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
DA (absolute) 0.098 1.417 0.070 0.945 -2.698 2.893 -0.062 0.309 -0.200 0.843 -0.684 0.561 
SIZE 0.014 0.018 0.790 0.433 -0.022 0.051 0.006 0.002 2.870 0.006 0.002 0.010 
LEVERAGE -0.001 0.000 -2.040 0.043 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.040 0.972 0.000 0.000 
ROA -0.019 0.006 -3.190 0.002 -0.031 -0.007 0.004 0.004 1.090 0.283 -0.003 0.011 
BOARDSIZE 0.018 0.020 0.890 0.376 -0.022 0.058 0.011 0.030 0.370 0.716 -0.050 0.072 
AUDIT 0.033 0.068 0.480 0.630 -0.101 0.166 0.061 0.065 0.940 0.352 -0.070 0.192 
_cons 0.199 0.271 0.730 0.464 -0.336 0.733 -0.245 0.217 -1.130 0.264 -0.682 0.191 
             
             
Number of obs 192 
     
Number of obs 53 
 
 
  
F(  7,   237) 2.320 
     
F(  7,   237) 7.310 
 
 
  
Prob > F 0.035 
     
Prob > F 0.000 
 
 
  
R-squared 0.063 
     
R-squared 0.253 
 
 
  
Root MSE 0.756 
     
Root MSE 0.501 
 
 
  
 
